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The instant action is an appeal from the Idaho Industrial Commission's ("Commission") 
April 13, 2015, Decision and Order denying worker's compensation benefits to Appellant 
Edward "Ed" Jordan (''Jordan"), based upon conclusions that his 2012 cervical spine surgery was 
not necessitated by undisputed industrial accident(s). The Court is asked to detem1ine vvhether 
the Commission's decisions were supported by substantial and competent evidence or otherwise 
comport with controlling legal authority. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The instant action came up for a Title 72 work comp hearing in front of Industrial 
Commission Referee, LaDawn Marsters, on July 18, 2013, in Boise, Idaho and was taken under 
advisement on February 4, 2015. Referee Marsters issued Recommended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on March 18, 2015. The Industrial Commission did not adopt Referee 
Marsters' Recommendations and issued its own Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
on April 13, 2015. 
The Industrial Commission reached the conclusion that Jordan was not "substantively" 
credible and thereby did not preponderantly prove that his 2012 cervical spine surgery was 
necessitated by the undisputed January 12, 2010, industrial accident. With that, the Commission 
held that all other issues \vere moot. Jordan timely filed this Appeal on May 15, 2015. 
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C. Statement of Facts 
Claimant/ Appellant, Edward "Ed" Jordan ("Jordan"), \Vas born on in 
Mountain Home, Idaho and did not graduate from high school. (Tr., p. 49, LI. 3-6). At the age 
of 17, Jordan enlisted in the United States Navy where he served with honor and distinction, 
receiving numerous commendations and merits. See, Hearing Ex Z, pgs. 994-1072; (Tr., p. 50, 
LI. 10-15). 
Jordan did not recall ever having any issues with, or receiving any medical treatment for, 
his neck and/or cervical area prior to enlisting in the Navy. (Tr., pg. 52, LI. 9-12). During his 
tenn of service, Jordan recalled being evaluated for muscle strain related to diving, which did not 
have any lasting residuals. Hr'g Ex. Y, pgs. 921-22; (Tr., pg. 52, LL 13 pg. 53, LL 4). Jordan 
also recalled treatment for muscle strain following an MV A in November of 2001, which did not 
result in any neck or cervical residuals. (Tr., pg. 53, LI. 10-14). Naval medical providers 
documented that upon receiving treatment one (I) day after the MV A, Jordan stated "never 
really had problems [with] neck" and that the symptoms were reported as ''non radiating." Hr'g 
Ex. Y, pgs. 893-94. Jordan did not undergo any cervical spine imaging nor cervical-related 
surgeries while in the service. Hr'g Ex. Y; Hr'g Ex. K, pg. 272. 
After 21 ½ years of service, Jordan honorably retired from the Navy in 2003. Upon 
retirement, Jordan was assessed with service related disabilities including: 10% left knee; 10% 
lumbar spine; I 0% sciatic nerve neuralgia; and 10% tinnitus. Hr'g Ex. K, pgs. 319-20; (Tr., p. 
51, LI. 2-10). Jordan was not assessed with any service-related neck or cervical disability and 
did not make mention of any neck pain upon separation. Hr'g Ex. K, pg. 272; (Tr., pg. 51, LI. 
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17-20). Similarly, Jordan testified that he was not expenencmg neck, cervical or ann 
radiculopathy problems at the time of his retirement from the Navy. (Tr., pg. 53, Ll. 15-17). 
Upon retiring from the Navy, Jordan returned to Mountain Home for approximately six 
( 6) months and then moved to Boise. In 2003, Jordan secured employment with 
Employer/Respondent ("Employer") as a milk delivery driver. Jordan was not experiencing any 
neck, cervical spine or radiculopathy problems, nor did he require any accommodation upon 
initiating his employment with Employer. (Tr., pg. 55, LL 5-11). Jordan's job tasks involved 
heavy physical labor. (Tr., pg. 54, LL 20-22). 
On or about May 16, 2006, Jordan experienced pain and numbness in his neck, along 
with shoulder pain, ann numbness and lovv back pain while trying to move a stack of milk. (Tr., 
pg. 56, LI. 1-6). Jordan described the onset as "sudden" and denied ever experiencing these 
types of neck symptoms prior to May 16, 2006. After dropping a gallon of milk due to 
numbness, Jordan notified his Supervisor. (Tr., pg. 56, LI. 13-24 ). 
Shortly thereafter, Jordan sought medical treatment at the St. Luke's Emergency Room. 
Hr' g Ex. I, pgs. 163-66. Jordan recalled that the attending ER physician instmcted him to 
follow-up at St. Luke's Occupational Health (0cc Health), given that it was Employer's 
mandated provider for work-related injuries. Hr' g Ex. I, pg. 166; (Tr., pg. 55, LI. 3-18). 
Jordan was initially evaluated at St. Luke's 0cc Health on May 17, 2006, with reports of 
ongoing right ann/hand numbness and tingling with increased pain in the right cervical 
musculature. The attending nurse practitioner assessed ongoing cervical and lumbar strain. Hr' g 
Ex. G, pgs. 111-12. In a May 25, 2006, treatment note, Ralph Sutherlin, D.O. assessed Jordan 
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with cervical neck strain and wanted to rule out right C4-6 radiculopathy along with acute 
lumbar muscular strain. Id. at pg. 119. A .tvfay 25 2006, Cervical I'v1RI revealed "a small to 
moderate-sized central posterior C4-5 protrusion." Id. at pg. 122 ( emphasis adde<l). Jordan 
recalled this being his first ever cervical MRI. (T., pg. 58, LI. 7-12). 
By June 9, 2006, Dr. Sutherland was assessing right cervical radiculopathy and wanted to 
"rnle out carpal tunnel syndrome versus nerve impingement." Hr' g Ex. G, pg. 126. A June 14, 
2006 EMG was interpreted as "Nonnal right upper extremity Electrodiagnostic exam." Id. at 
129 ( emphasis added). On September 1, 2006, Dr. Sutherlin set forth that Jordan was "fully 
resolved from his severe muscle strain from 5/ 16/06," declared him at maximum medical 
improvement and diagnosed "Carpal tunnel syndrome bilaterally per recent EMG." Id. at 138 
( emphasis added). Upon release, Jordan was not assigned any pennanent work restrictions and 
resumed his nom1al work duties. (Tr., pg. 59, Ll. 8-15). The covering work comp surety, ACE 
Insurance, accepted the 2006 claim and paid benefits through its third party administrator, 
Gallagher Bassett. 
During the interim 3 ½ years, Jordan experienced "[j]ust occasional light pain and a little 
numbness depending on a position or something" which would always resolve. (Tr., pg. 59, LL 
16-23). Further, between the time of his 2006 release and January 12, 2010, Jordan did not miss 
any time from work due to neck, cervical or radiculopathy problems. Similarly, Jordan did not 
recall ever receiving treatment specifically for his neck, cervical region or anns, between the 
2006 release and January 12, 2010. (Tr., pg. 59, LL 24 pg. 60, LI. 7). In January of 2007, 
Jordan was treated at 0cc Health for an intervening work-related right ankle injury, with the 
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explicit notation "Patient has no ongoing illnesses," nor any other indicators of symptomatic 
neck, cervical, or arm conditions. Hr'g Ex. G, pgs. 141-42 (emphasis added). 
Unfmiunately, on or about January 12, 2010, Jordan experienced neck/cervical 
injury(ies) while working for Employer. At the beginning of his January 12, 2010, shift, 
Jordan's neck and cervical region felt "fine." However, Jordan testified that while attempting to 
manually maneuver a trailer dolly, weighing approximately one (1) ton, he experienced the 
''sudden" onset of neck pain \vith a "terrible burning across my shoulders" with bilateral an11 
numbness, right worse than left. (Tr., pg. 6 I, LL 5 - pg. 63 LI. I) ( emphasis added). On a 
comparative basis, Jordan testified that that the neck, cervical and radiculopathy symptoms he 
experienced on January 12, 2010, \Vere "more intense," "worse ... a lot more extreme ... 
wouldn't go away," than those following the earlier May 16, 2006, incident. Hr'g Ex. N, pg. 
354; (Tr., pg. 63, LL 2-7) (emphasis added). The covering work comp surety, Indemnity 
Insurance Co. of North America, accepted the 20 l 0 claim and paid benefits through its third 
party administrator, Liberty Mutual. 
As before, Jordan was required to receive treatment from St. Luke's Occupational Health. 
(Tr., pg. 63, LI. 15-20). Jordan initially sought treatment at 0cc Health the next day, January 13, 
2010, rep01iing "pain and burning in his neck and right shoulder area ... some numbness down 
his right hand, more in the fourth and fifth finger." Hr'g Ex. G, pgs. 148-49 (emphasis added). 
The attending physician's assistant (PA) assessed cervical and right shoulder strain. In a January 
25, 20 I 0, report, the PA noted pain "between the spine and shoulder blade on the right side." Id. 
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at 151. Jordan testified that during this course of this 2010 treatment at 0cc Health, his neck, 
cervical and radiculopathy symptoms never permanently improved. (Tr., pg. 64, LI. 15 18). 
Similarly, the PA recorded "pain in the right mid back near his scapula ... it will start to 
burn in that area ... that knot still gives him grief" in a February 4, 2010, follow-up report. 
Hr'g Ex. G, pg. 154 (emphasis added). During the last in-person treatment session on February 
16, 2010, Jordan \Vas evaluated by Dr. Cody Heiner for the first time, who, in-tum, recorded 
"Most of his symptoms have resolved with the exception of one specific spot in the right 
pcriscapular area where he describes a 'knot' and burning sensation." Id. at 157 (emphasis 
added). Jordan confinned that 0cc Health did not have him undergo a cervical MRI related to 
the January 12, 2010, industrial accident/injury(ies ). Hr' g Ex. G; (Tr., pg. 64, LI. 2-5). In 
contemplating a "probable phone discharge" Dr. Heiner specifically advised "The patient was 
counseled that the pain docs not indicate any significant pathology and should resolve 
gradually over time ... " Hr' g Ex. G, pg. 157 ( emphasis added). Jordan acknowledged being 
infonned of this specific prognosis during his last treatment at 0cc Health. (Tr., pg. 64, LL 23 
pg. 65. LL 6). Dr. Heiner injected Jordan with lidocaine and never treated him again. Hr'g Ex. 
G, pg. 157. 
Throughout the following weeks and months, Jordan described that the neck and cervical 
symptoms were "constantly there and progressively worse at the same time." (Tr., pg. 92, LI. 
14-20). During this same time period, Jordan was also simultaneously dealing with, and 
receiving treatment from his family physician, Dr. Michael Foutz, for chronic bilateral knee and 
low back problems. Hr'g Ex. D; (Tr., pg. 65, LL 16-22). Jordan characterized himself as having 
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a high pain tolerance, which has been verified by Dr. Foutz 1• Eventually, Jordan realized that 
despite Dr. Heiner's assurances, his unrelenting neck and cervical related symptoms were not 
getting better and he sought treatment from Dr. Foutz in the Summer of 2011. Hr' g Ex. D, pgs. 
25-27. 
During a pre-hearing deposition, Dr. Foutz explained that while he was primarily 
treating Jordan for his low back and knees in July of 2011, he was also treating Jordan's on-
going neck problems. (Dr. Michael Foutz 6/26/13 Deposition Transcript, pg. 32, LL I 0-16). Dr. 
Foutz recalled that Jordan sought treatment for neck symptoms in July of 2011 because "he was 
having such a hard time working." Hr'g Ex. D, pgs. 25-27; (Dr. Foutz Depo Tr., p. 37, LL 21-
25). Dr. Foutz testified that the July 26, 2011, Progress Notes, on page 2 under the heading of 
"Review of Systems," specifically recorded Jordan's neck problems as "neck pain which is 
[static] in nature - no better or worse." Hr'g Ex. D, pg. 26 (emphasis added); (Dr. Foutz Depo 
Tr., pg. 9, LL 11 - pg. I 0, LU). Dr. Foutz went on to expound that an examination revealed 
tenderness in Jordan's cervical region. Hr' g Ex. D, pg. 26. Dr. Foutz further elucidated that his 
treatment plan included an X-ray of Jordan's neck "probably due to the pain elicited on exam." 
Hr'g Ex. D, pg. 27; (Dr. Foutz Depo Tr., pg. 11, LL 3-4). In addition to diagnostics, Dr. Foutz 
relayed that he provided Jordan with a prescription for Nortriptyline to, among other things, 
"also treat neck complaints and any radicular pain in the ann ... " Hr' g Ex. D, pg. 27; (Dr. Foutz 
Depo Tr., pg. 11, LL 5-14). 
1 "Because of his high tolerance for pain ... " Hr'g Ex D, pg. 46 
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An August 3, 2011, cervical spine X-ray was interpreted as demonstrating mid cervical 
spondylotic changes \Vith decreased intcrvertcbral space height at C5-6 level with minimal 
retrolisthesis of CS over C6 along with mild bony neural foraminal stenosis at C5-6 and C4-5, 
more pronounced on the right. Hr' g Ex. D, pg. 27-1. When repeatedly pressed on direct 
examination as to the possible relevance of cervical degenerative joint disease, Dr. Foutz opined 
"I would go further than that. I would say without some kind of additional injury, it would be 
unlikely that arthritis alone caused all the changes we sa\v." (Dr. Foutz Depo Tr., pg. 22, LL 
6-13 ). While Dr. Foutz became aware that Jordan experienced another work-related neck injury 
after the one in 2006, he was not aware of the exact date of the second injury. (Dr. Foutz Dcpo 
Tr., pg. 22, LL 18-23). Ultimately, Dr. Foutz deferred the question of cervical causation 
necessitating surgery to Dr. Doerr. (Dr. Foutz Depo Tr., pg. 27, LI. I 0-21 ). 
Upon referral from Dr. Foutz, Jordan was evaluated by Board Certified orthopedic 
surgeon Dr. Timothy Doerr on August I 8, 2011, for "axial neck pain" and bilateral knee pain. 
Hr'g Ex. E, pg. 50. Following the physical examination, Dr. Doerr diagnosed Jordan with 
cervical radiculopathy, which he postulated "may be related to his previous industrial injury," 
along with bilateral knee meniscal tears. Hr' g Ex. E, pg. 48. Compared to the previous May 25, 
2006, cervical imaging, an August 23, 2011, cervical MRI revealed "broad based osseous 
ridging/disc bulging at C4-5 and CS-6 levels," ·with "severe" foraminal stenosis as well as a 
"C6-7 ... Broad based disc bulge." Hr'g Ex. D, pgs. 37-38 (emphasis added). Jordan 
followed-up on August 25, 2011, for "cervical neck pain with right greater than left 
radiculopathy" and Dr. Doerr recommended that "his best surgical option would be C4-6 anterior 
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cervical decompression and fusion." Hr'g Ex. E, pg. 52. During the interim, Jordan underwent 
left and right knee surgeries as performed Dr. Doerr on 1,2011,and 
2011, respectively. Hr'g Ex. E, pgs. 56-58 and 68-70. 
In a September 15, 2011, "Progress Note," Dr. Doerr reevaluated Jordan for "C4 to C6 
stenosis with neck pain and right greater than left arm radiculopathy." Hr'g Ex. E, pg. 60. 
Premised upon a review of Jordan's 2006 medical records2, Dr. Doerr set forth "I believe that 
this is medically more probable than not that his need for C4 to C6 anterior cervical 
decompression and fusion is directly related to his industrial injury of 5/16/06." Hr'g Ex. E, pg. 
61. Dr. Doerr also specifically discounted the impact of any "progressive degeneration since the 
MRI on 5/25/06." Id. Interestingly, in a September 27, 2011, letter proffered directly to the 
2006 work comp Surety, Dr. Doerr repeated his September 15, 2011, diagnosis3, agam 
discounting any degenerative impact and recommending surgery. Id. at pg. 64. 
Significantly, in a subsequent November 17, 2011, letter authored directly to the 2006 
work comp Surety, Dr. Doerr specifically accounted for the fact that Jordan suffered a "second 
injury on 01/12/10, at which time he was moving a very heavy dolly and had onset of neck pain 
radiating into his right shoulder with numbness down into his right hand." Id. at pg. 77 
(emphasis added). With this information, Dr. Doerr opined that "I do believe that Edward's 
initial injury on 5/16/06 resulted in his C4-5 and C5-6 injuries causing neck pain with 
"I have reviewed Edward's previous records from his previous industrial injury on 5/16 106.'' See. Exhibit E, pg. 
60. 
3 "I have reviewed Edward's previous records from his industrial injury on 5/16/06." See. Exhibit E, pg. 64. 
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radiculopathy. His 01/12/10 injury resulted in a traumatic event with permanent 
aggravation of his initial preexisting injury." Id. (emphasis added). 
A pre-operative May 25, 2012, comparative cervical spine MRI was interpreted as 
demonstrating "unchanged" and "No significant change compared to the scan dated August 23, 
201 L" Hr'g Ex. E, pg. 78 (emphasis added). Dr. DoeIT appreciated a "moderate central canal 
stenosis \Vith severe bilateral fonnainal stenosis at C4-5 and C5-6 ... right sided disc protrusion 
at C6-7 resulting in moderate right sided canal stenosis." Id. at pg. 79. On June 6, 2012, Jordan 
underwent a C4-7 anterior cervical decompression and fusion perfonned by Dr. Doen. Id. at 83-
85. Prior to the surgery, Jordan testified that he was working "[i]n constant pain. I didn't have a 
choice. I had to have a paycheck to pay bills." (Tr., pg. 102, LL 15-19). 
Jordan continued to follow up with Dr. DoeIT and was declared at maximum medical 
improvement on November I, 2012. Utilizing the Sixth Edition AMA Guides, Dr. Doerr rated 
Jordan \Vith 8% whole person impainnent with "no apportionment for preexisting disease." 
Hr'g Ex. E, pg. 102 (emphasis added). Through a September 19, 2012, letter, Dr. DoeIT imposed 
restrictions of "50 pound pennanent lifting restrictions with no overhead lifting and no repetitive 
twisting or bending of his neck." Hr' g Ex. E, pg. 100. Subsequently, Dr. DoeIT infonned 
Employer that Jordan's poundage restrictions were lowered to "permanent 30# frequent 
lifting/pulling/pushing and 50# occasional lifting/pulling/pushing." Hr'g Ex. Q, pg. 449. Upon 
review of Jordan's date-of-injury job requirements, Dr. DoeIT opined ''this will preclude him 
from returning to his previous line of work. I would recommend job retraining to accommodate 
these new restrictions." Hr' g Ex. E, pg. 100. 
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Jordan wanted to return to work for Employer following the cervical surgery. However, 
upon being released by Dr. Doerr with permanent work restrictions, Employer terminated Jordan 
five (5) days later, under the guise of an inability to accommodate his physical limitations. Hr'g 
Ex. Q, pg. 447. In anticipation of the reality "Knowing that I wasn't going to have an income in, 
so I couldn't make my house payments ... " Jordan and his Wife sold their house sh01ily before 
the June 6, 2012, fusion surgery. (Tr., pg. 103, LL 16-19). The neck/cervical medical and/or 
surgical bills Jordan incurred following treatment discharge from 0cc Health in 2010, were not 
covered, nor reimbursed by either the 2006 or the 2010 work comp Sureties. Likewise, neither 
work comp Surety provided Jordan with any time loss benefits following his June 6, 20 I 2, 
cervical fusion. (Tr., pg. 74, LI. 3 - p. 75. LL 3). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED on APPEAL 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission's conclusion that Claimant/ Appellant failed 
to prove his 2012 cervical spine surgery was necessitated by the undisputed 
January 12, 2010, work-related accident, is supported by substantial and 
competent evidence, or othenvise comports with controlling law? 
2. Did the Industrial Commission err in detennining that all remaining issues were 
moot? 
III. ATTORNEY FEES on APPEAL 
Jordan is entitled to an award of attorney fees. The Idaho Workers' Compensation Act 
provides in relevant part: 
Attorney's fees - Punitive costs in certain cases. - If the commission or any court 
before whom any proceedings are brought under this law detennines that the 
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employer or his surety contested a claim for compensation made by an injured 
employee ... without reasonable ground, or his surety neglected or refused \Vithin a 
reasonable time after receipt of a written claim for compensation to pay to the 
injured employee ... the compensation provided by law ... In all such cases, the 
fees of attorneys employed by injured employees . . . shall be fixed by the 
co1111111ss1on. 
See, I,C. § 72-804 (emphasis original). Defendants'/Respondents' denial of Jordan's claim was 
unreasonable. 
As set f01ih in/1·a, the evidence in record proves and overwhelmingly indicates that 
Jordan's June 6, 2012, tri-level cervical surgery was caused by the undisputed and/or 
uncontested January 12, 2010, work-related accident. Thus, denial of Jordan's claim was 
unreasonable. Therefore, the Court should award attorney fees and costs to Appellant for all 
stages of Jordan's claim, including those below, on appeal and any on remand. 
IV. ARGUMENT and AUTHORITY 
The provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act must be liberally construed "in 
favor of the employees in order to serve the humane purposes for which it was promulgated." 
Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009) 
( citations omitted). The humane purposes which the Act serves, leaves no room for narrow, 
technical construction. Reese v. V-1 Oil Co., 141 Idaho 630, 633, 115 P.3d 721 (2005). 
"Doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of the worker who has been injured." Combs v. 
Kelly Logging, 115 Idaho 695, 698, 769 P.2d 572 (1989) (citation omitted). 
Unfortunately, the underlying premise of the Industrial Commission's April 13, 2015, 
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Findings, Conclusions and Order, is that since the Commission deemed the injured worker's 
injury/symptom history not ··substantively credible," then all other evidence, including medical 
opinions, vvhich the injured worker presented in support of his case for coverage under the Act, is 
necessarily intractably tainted and will not be considered persuasive. Utilization of such a 
seemingly arbitrary deliberative device fails to account for the reality that most injured workers 
are overwhelmed, stressed, intimidated, etc. about being thrust into a completely foreign "legal'' 
system and otherwise entirely ignorant as to the legal and medical dynamics integral to Idaho 
work comp cases. Moreover, such an administrative deliberative methodology is seemingly at 
odds with controlling legal authority. See generally, Stevens-1l1cAtee, 145 Idaho 325, 179 P.3d 
288 (2008). Remarkably the Court has had occasion to implicitly rebuff this exact proposition in 
holding, "Nonetheless, because the issue of causation is dispositive on appeal and does not 
take into account the Referee's unsupported detennination that [the claimant] was not credible . 
. . " Knowlton v. Wood River Medical Center, 151 Idaho 135, 145, 254 P.3d 36 (2011 ). The 
Court recently reaffim1ed in ruling "A referee may not undiagnose a claimant before the 
Commission based on the referee's own lay understanding of what the referee believes would 
change a qualified medical professional 's diagnosis and professional opinion." Mazzone v. 
Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750,759,302 P.3d 718 (2013) (emphasis added). This would 
appear especially pertinent in Jordan's case, given that the occurrence of the January 12, 2010, 
work-related accident and initial injuries are undisputed and/or uncontested, prompting the legal 
presumption and reversing the burden of proof to Defendants/Respondents. Vawter v. UPS, 
Inc., 155 Idaho 903, 3 I 8 P.3d 893, 898 (2014) ("When an injury occurs on an employer's 
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premises, a presumption arises that the injury arose out of the claimant's employment.") The 
Commission failed to address the reversed burdon of proof in this case. 
A. The Industrial Commission's April 13, 2015, Findings, Conclusions and 
Order are Not Supported bv Substantial and Competent Evidence and Do 
Not Comport with Controlling Law. 
The overwhelming preponderance of objective, reliable, and corroborated evidence 
proves that Jordan suffered lumbar injuries/aggravations thereby necessitating surgical 
intervention as a direct result of the undisputed/uncontested January 12, 2010, industrial 
accident. "Whether the Commission's factual findings are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence is a question of law," over which the Court exercises free review. Tarbet v. 
J.R. Simplot Co., 151 Idaho 755, 264 P.3d 394, 397 (2011) (citing F(fe v. The Home Depot, 
Inc., 151 Idaho 509, 260 P.3d 1180 (2011)). The "substantial evidence rule" is said to be a 
''middle position which ... requires a serious review ... Put simply ... the substantial evidence 
rule requires a court to detennine 'whether [the agency's] findings are in fact reasonable."' 
Idaho State Insurance Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257,260,715 P.2d 927 (1985) (citations 
omitted) (quotations original). Substantial and competent evidence "is relevant evidence that a 
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Zapata v. J.R. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 
513,515,975 P.2d 1178 (1999). In the event Commission findings are unsupported by 
substantial and competent evidence, the Court reviews "the factual record in a light independent 
of those findings." Stevens-lt.fcAtee v. Potlatch Cmp., 145 Idaho 325, 331, 179 P.3d 288 (2008). 
The Industrial Commission's findings are not premised upon complete, relevant evidence that a 
reasonable mind might accept to support conclusions. 
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1. The Industrial Commission's credibility determinations are not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
The overwhelming objective, unrebutted evidence in conjunction with controlling law 
establishes that Jordan is credible. The Industrial Commission's credibility findings "are still 
subject to review by this Court" Knowlton v. Wood River Medical Center, 151 Idaho 135, 144, 
254 P.3d 36 (2011 ). To that end, the Commission's findings regarding credibility are bifurcated 
into two categories, "observational credibility" and "substantive credibility." Stevens-lWcAtee v. 
Potlatch Cmp., 145 Idaho 325, 330. If a presiding Referee docs not make any conclusions as to 
a witness's demeanor on the stand, then "observational credibility is not in question." Stevens-
McAtee v. Potlatch Cmp., 145 Idaho at 330 (emphasis added). The appropriate standard for 
evaluating "substantive credibility" is "substantial consistency supported by the other evidence 
in the record." Clark v. Shari's Managemeut Cmp., 155 Idaho 576,314 P.3d 631,636 (2013). 
''Consistent" not identical, testimonies constitutes substantive credibility. Clark v. Shari's 
Management Corp., 314 P.3d at 636 (citing Steve11s-il1cAtee v. Potlatch Cmp., 145 Idaho 325). 
The Commission's purported credibility findings and conclusions are an overly narrmv and 
hyper-technical construction of the circumstances presented in this case. 
From the onset, it should be recognized that the hearing record does not contain any 
objective evidence impugning Jordan's character or propensity for truthfulness. Quite to the 
contrary, 21 ½ years of service records and commendations reveal an honorable individual 
described as "dedicated, skillful, resourceful," "focused," "The 'Go-To' man," "continually 
strives for perfection," "a significant contribution to the Naval Special Warfare Group ONE and 
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its personnel," "professional judgment arc superb," "extremely valuable asset,'' ''sets the finest 
example," '·the finest Command Career Counselor with whom I have ever served!'" '·SIMPLY 
STATED, THE BEST!" "a SUPERSTAR!" "exemplary," "extremely contentious," as well as 
"Outstanding" on innumerable occasions, while both deployed overseas and serving stateside. 
Hr'g Ex. Z, pgs. 996, 1003, 1005, 1007, 1010, 1055-59, 1068, and 1071-72. Thus, to lend 
credence to the Commission's credibility detem1ination, would seemingly require unquestioning 
acceptance that despite living an exemplary professional and personal life, Jordan, for the first 
time ever, made a deliberate choice to engage in less-than-honorable and/or untruthful conduct 
throughout the course of his worker's compensation claim. In consideration of the foregoing, not 
only does this seems highly improbable, but appears to reveal a systemic administrative records 
interpretation that is overly narrow and always defaulting against an injured worker, rather than 
considering other obvious, reasonable, neutral explanations or options. 
Referee Marsters failed to direct! y address Jordan's "observational credibility" and at one 
point even conceded "Claimant's testimony at the hearing regarding the progression of his 
symptoms appeared credible ... " Referee's 3/18/15 Findings & Recommendations, pg. 32. 
Further, the Commission recognized that "while Referee Marsters' proposed recommendation 
found that Claimant was not credible, she did so on the basis that Claimant's lacked 'substantive 
credibility' ... " R., pg. 34. As such, Jordan is "observationally credible" as a matter of law. 
Stevens-AJcAtee v. Potlatch C017J., 145 Idaho at 330. 
Instead, the Commission opted to focus on establishing that Jordan was not 
"substantively credible" after his February 16, 2010, treatment discharge, because he apparently 
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did not fit within some undefined administratively conceived prototype for injured workers, due 
to the fact that he did not incessantly complain and/or constantly seek medical treatment for his 
neck/cervical symptoms during the interim. Initially, this administrative narrative fails to 
account for fundamental, unrebutted facts and circumstances personal to Jordan. First, it is 
inarguable that at the time of the February 16, 2010, discharge, Jordan was, in fact, experiencing 
ongoing neck and cervical symptoms. Additionally, as part of the February 16, 2010, discharge, 
Dr. Heiner specifically advised Jordan that his on-going cervical "pain does not indicate any 
significant pathology and should resolve gradually over time ... " Hr'g Ex. G, pg. 157 
( emphasis added). Next, in addition to on-going neck/cervical problems, Jordan was 
simultaneously dealing with several other severe physical ailments, including his low back and 
bilateral knees, which ultimately necessitated surgical intervention. Hr'g Ex. E, pgs. 56 and 68; 
(Dr. Foutz Depo Tr., pg. 32, LL 10-16). Finally, it is undisputed that Jordan has a high pain 
tolerance, as verified by Dr. Foutz, Hr'g Ex. D, pg. 46 ("Because of his high tolerance for pain 
... ") These unrefuted circumstances alone seemingly establish that the Commission's 
''continuing symptom" narrative is not supported by the evidence in record. 
Significantly, contrary to the Commission's "continuing symptom" narrative, a review of 
the objective records proves that upon realizing that, despite Dr. Heiner's assurances, his cervical 
symptoms were not getting better, Jordan did, in fact, affinnatively seek out medical treatment 
specifically for his neck. This is reaffinned by Dr. Foutz's testimony that while he was primarily 
treating Jordan for his low back and knees in July of 2011, he was also treating Jordan's on-
going neck problems. (Dr. Foutz Depo Tr., pg. 32, LL 10-16). Dr. Foutz qualified that Jordan 
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sought treatment for neck symptoms in July of 2011 because "he was having such a hard time 
working.'· Hr'g Ex. D, pgs. 25-27; (Dr. Foutz Depo Tr., p. 37, LI. 21-25) (emphasis added). 
Upon direct questioning by Defendants/Respondents, Dr. Foutz pointed out that the 
commensurate July 26, 201 L Progress Notes, on page 2 under the heading of "Revie\v of 
Systems," in fact, specifically recorded Jordan's neck problems as "neck pain \vhich is [static] in 
nature no better or ,vorse." Hr'g Ex. D, pg. 26 (emphasis added); (Dr. Foutz Depo Tr., pg. 9, 
LL 11 pg. 10, Ll. 1 ). Dr. Foutz went on to explain that an examination revealed tenderness in 
Jordan's cervical region. Hr'g Ex. D, pg. 26. Dr. Foutz further clarified that his treatment plan 
included an X-ray of Jordan's neck "probably due to the pain elicited on exam." Hr'g Ex. D, pg. 
27; (Dr. Foutz Depo Tr., pg. 11, LI. 3-4). In addition to diagnostics, Dr. Foutz described that he 
provided Jordan with a prescription for Nortriptyline to, among other things, "also treat neck 
complaints and any radicular pain in the arm ... " Hr'g Ex. D, pg. 27; (Dr. Foutz Depo Tr., pg. 
11, LI. 5-14). As such, Dr. Foutz's unrebutted and factually substantiated testimony directly 
controverts the underlying premise of the Commission's "on-going symptom" substantive 
credibility nan-ative. 
Unfortunately, the Commission employed various interpretation methods in an attempt to 
somehow marginalize Dr. Foutz's unrebutted testimony. By way of example, the Commission 
proclaimed: 
On August 8, 2011, Claimant advised an office worker calling on Dr. Foutz's 
behalf that he wished to discuss with Dr. Foutz his right knee condition, as well as 
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concerns about the July 26, chart note may convey. See CE 30. Claimant does 
not remember the call, but does not dispute it. 4 
R., pg. 16 ( emphasis added). The fundamental deficit with this Commission assertion is that a 
review, of Jordan's July 24, 2012, deposition transcript and the July 18, 2013, hearing transcript 
seemingly reveals that he was never asked, nor did he provide any testimony specifically in 
relation to contact with Dr. Foutz's Office on August 8, 2011. Hr'g Ex. D, pg. 30. This raises 
the question as to how Jordan could supposedly "not remember" or "not dispute" a question he 
was never asked in the first place? In any event, it is axiomatic that non-existent testimony 
cannot constitute substantial and competent evidence in support of the Commission's 
"substantive credibility" findings/conclusions. Quite to the contrary, such a circumstance would 
seemingly exhibit a lack of objective administrative deliberation. Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, 
Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 761, 302 P.3d 718 (2013) ("Simply, for an agency to rely on facts withheld 
from the record is a denial of due process.") 
Astonishingly, in support of its "on-going symptom" narrative, the Commission went on 
to declare: 
At his deposition in June 2013, Dr. Foutz testified that Claimant specifically 
sought treatment for cervical spine symptoms because he was having such a 
hard time with work. The Commission finds the chart note and telephone 
message of July 26, 2011 are more credible evidence of Claimant's stated 
concerns during that particular time. 5 
4 This is a direct carry-over from paragraph 36 of Referee Marsters' Findings & Recommendations. Referee's 
3/18/15 Findings & Recommendations, pg. 16. 
5 This is an identical, direct carry-over from paragraph 3 7 of Referee Marsters' Findings & Recommendations. 
Referee's 3/18/15 Findings & Recommendations, pg. 16. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF, Page 19 
R., pg. 16 ( emphasis added). Again, a fundamental deficit is that the record does not contain 
evidence of any ''telephone message from July 26, 2011 _,. Br'g Ex. D, pgs. 26-27. Regardless, 
this kind of unilateral credibility delineation seemingly violates controlling judicial mandates. 
Specifically, in Stevens-JlilcAtee, under analogous circumstances, the Court ruled: 
In light of [the treating doctor's] statements at deposition qualifying the medical 
fonns \vhich 01iginated from his office, the evidence contained in those forms 
cannot be considered to be substantial evidence contradicting [the injured 
worker's] presentation of medical evidence. 
Stevens-McAtee, 145 Idaho at 336 (emphasis added). As such, 111 accord with controlling 
judicial dictates, the Commission was required to accept Dr. Foutz's testimonial 
qualifications/explanations of his own medical records, thereby further bolstering Jordan's 
presentation of medical evidence in this case. Thus the Commission's unilateral "more credible" 
rationalization of Dr. Foutz's medical evidence does not constitute substantial and competent 
evidence in support of its credibility findings/conclusions. 
Astoundingly, the Commission goes on to assert that "Claimant did not report any 
changes or specific concerns regarding his cervical spine ... " R., pg. 16 ( emphasis added). 
Conspicuously, in addition to the foregoing, this fails to account for the reality of the evidence in 
record that on July 26, 2011, Dr. Foutz ordered an "X-ray of the neck," prescribed Nortriptyline 
to "also treat neck complaints and any radicular pain in the ann ... " and then refe1Ted Jordan to 
an orthopedic specialist for "axial neck pain." (Dr. Foutz Depo Tr., pg. 11, LL 5-14); Hr'g Ex. 
D, pg. 27; Hr'g Ex. E, pg. 50. In consideration of the foregoing, Dr. Foutz's medical 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF, Page 20 
evidence/testimony constitutes substantial and competent evidence ,vhich universally rebuts the 
Commission's purported credibility findings and conclusions. 
The Commission then set out to further impugn Jordan's "substantive" credibility based 
on purported "incorrect history" renditions, in that he basically did not give the post-20 I 0 
medical providers a detailed rcrbatim chronology or complete dossier of his medical treatment 
and did not specifically convey that he subjectively believed that his on-going cervical symptoms 
were specifically related to the undisputed and/or uncontested January 12, 2010, work-related 
accident and initial injuries. At its premise, such administrative extrapolations seemingly 
contravene controlling law and judicial mandates, in that the Idaho Supreme Comi have been 
unequivocal in declaring that an injured worker's ·'personal and practical" view of a work-related 
accident or injury are not controlling, as such a detennination "requires a legal conclusion that 
a claimant is not required to resolve." Page v .. McCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 346, 109 
P.3d 1084 (2005) (emphasis added). Arguably, "substantive" credibility dete1111inations that are 
derived in contradiction to controlling legal authority cannot constitute substantial and competent 
evidence. 
In any event, despite the actual circumstances, the Commission narrowly and hyper-
technically dissected Dr. Doerr's treatment notes in an attempt to justify its "incorrect history" 
narrative. Notably, from the onset, the Commission conceded that "Dr. Doerr's notes do not 
provide any further insight into his reason( s) for revising his causation opinion, and he was not 
deposed in these proceedings" along with "Dr. Doerr's deposition was not taken ... " R., pgs. 21 
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and 30. Despite this concession, the Commission proceeded to interpret Dr. Docn-'s treatment 
notes in a nanuw and overly technical manner, to the universal prejudice of Jordan. 
The Commission started by asserting that as a result of an August 18, 2011, evaluation of 
Jordan, "This history caused Dr. Doerr to relate Claimant's cervical spine injuries to the 2006 
industrial accident and he lobbied the surety on the risk for the 2006 accident to authorize the 
cervical spine surgery ... " R., pg. 30. The actual record reveals that by no means was Dr. Doerr 
"caused" to relate Jordan's cervical spine injuries to the 2006 industrial accident. In fact, in the 
August 18, 2011, treatment note, Dr. Doerr made no such definitive diagnosis, instead merely 
contemplating "it appears that this may be related to his previous industrial injury." Hr' g Ex. E, 
pg. 48 (emphasis added). Similarly, Dr. Doen- did not "lobby" for surgical authorization 
immediately following this initial August 18, 2011, evaluation, as this request did not occur until 
after three (3) intervening medical appointments and a September 1, 2011, left knee surgery. 
Hr' g Ex. E, pgs. 52-64. A more reasonable interpretation of the circumstances surrounding this 
initial August 18, 2011, evaluation is that in his capacity as a surgeon, Dr. Doerr was presented 
with an individual requiring multiple surgeries for various severe physical ailments, made notes 
without the benefit of cmTesponding medical records and started triaging accordingly. This 
neutral interpretation is supported by the fact that Dr. Doerr opted to start treatment by first 
surgically addressing Jordan's left knee on September 1, 2011. Hr'g Ex. E, pg. 56. 
The Commission then goes on to assert "It is apparent that at some point in time between 
September 27, 2011 and November 17, 2011 Claimant came to Dr. Doerr with a new history of 
the January 12, 2010 accident, a history that he never previously shared with Dr. Doerr." R., pg. 
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32. Again, this does not appear to be an objective interpretation of Dr. Doerr's records, in that 
his September 15, 2011, "Progress Notes," specifically reference "he was again seen at 
Occupational Health Services on 1/12/10 with similar predominately right ann complaints." 
Hr'g Ex. E, pg. 61. This raises the question of how exactly was Jordan "hiding" the January 12, 
2010, industrial accident from Dr. Doerr while simultaneously disclosing the medical provider 
that treated him on that same date? A more availing scenario is that Dr. Doerr had yet to receive 
and review all of the medical records related to the January 12, 2010, uncontested industrial 
accident. 
Regardless, even assuming, arguendo, that Jordan did not explicitly disclose the January 
12, 2010, uncontested industrial accident to Dr. Doerr during his initial visits, such is neither 
detenninative of Jordan's credibility, nor the issue of compensability. Notably, even the 
Commission !:,lfants that its "incorrect history" narrative is premised upon its assertion that 
"Claimant gave no such history to either Dr. Foutz or to Dr. Doerr, at least initially." R., pg. 35 
( emphasis added). In rejecting a very similar assertion, the Court ruled that intervening medical 
notations did not indicate that the treating physician was expressing an opinion that a disc 
herniation was not causally related to work, but rather "It merely indicated that [the injured 
worker] had not told [the treating physician] about any catastrophic event that induced his injury 
and that [the injured worker] merely thought ... that it was merely the [result of a non-industrial 
incident]." Stevens-McAtee, 145 Idaho at 334. This judicial deliberation substantiates and 
effectively reaffinns that even if Jordan personally believed that his ongoing cervical symptoms 
following his 2010 medical discharge were somehow related to the first 2006 uncontested work-
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF, Page 23 
related accident, such a subjective belief does not somehow supplant the informed opinions of 
his medical providers, including his treating Board Certified orthopedic surgeon. See also, Page 
v. 1HcCai11 Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho at 346 
The Commission then proffered amalgamated reasonmg that ''The importance of 
Claimant's history to Dr. Doerr in this synthesis is illustrated by the about face Dr. Doerr was 
forced to execute when ale1ied to the fact that there was a second accident of January 12,201 O." 
R., pg. 31. Again, the records are wholly devoid of any evidence that Dr. Doerr was "forced to 
execute" an "about face" in making a second surgical authorization request. Notably, none of 
Dr. Doerr's notes or records document any kind of concern related to Jordan's truthfulness or the 
content of his factual and medical history disclosures. As a matter of practicality, this 
administrative rationalization presumes that Dr. Doerr would knowingly perfonn not one (I), but 
three (3) surgeries on a compulsive prevaricator, which seems highly improbable. The 
Commission also fails to consider that Dr. Doerr's surgical requests were made directly to the 
work comp Surety responsible for the 2006 uncontested industrial accident/injuries and it is just 
as likely that it provided Jordan's 2010 treatment records to the Doctor in an attempt to evade 
liability. Hr' g Ex. E, pgs. 64 and 77. Regardless, the most feasible scenario is that once the 
knees were surgically addressed, Dr. Doerr's inquiries, research/record revie\v and notations in 
relation to Jordan's cervical spine became increasingly more detailed and were ultimately 
premised upon a review of the pertinent 2006 and 2010 treatment records. 
Inconsideration of the foregoing, a more imperative question anses as to why the 
Commission would c1itieize a treating surgeon for incorporating pertinent infonnation as it 
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became available and adjusting his causation op11110ns accordingly. Conspicuously, the 
Commission did not levy any such criticism against Dr. Freidman when he generated a second 
IME report after being provided with additional medical records. Hr' g Ex. 1, pgs. 761-62. 
Fundamentally, the Commission's criticism of Dr. Doerr is that he received and considered the 
pe1iinent 2006 and 2010 medical information in a protracted chronological manner which they 
disliked. Irrespective, the Commission cannot dispute that after receiving and considering all of 
the pertinent medical records/information, Dr. Doerr rendered an unambiguous causation 
opinion, in his capacity as Jordan's treating surgeon, that "Edvvard's initial injury on 5/16/06 
resulted in his C4-5 injuries causing neck pain with radiculopathy. His 1/12/10 injury resulted 
in a traumatic event with permanent aggravation of his initial preexisting injury." Hr'g Ex. E, 
pg. 77 ( emphasis added). 
The Commission then purports to parlay this "on-going symptom" and "incorrect 
history" narrative as a means to summarily discount Dr. Verska's expert evaluation and 
assessment, therein setting forth "Dr. Verska . . . took a history from Claimant to the effect that 
Claimant's problems with his neck and upper extremity resolved following the 2006 accident, 
but did not resolve following the 2010 accident." R., pg. 32 ( emphasis added). This "effectual" 
extrapolation is not based on the entirety of the evidence, in that through his August 3, 2012, 
IME report, Dr. Verska recorded that after the 2006 industrial accident/injury(ies), Jordan 
experienced "negligible neck or ann pain." Hr'g Ex. F, pg. 103 (emphasis added). In fact, Dr. 
Verska reaffinned this notation at the end of his November 22, 2013, deposition. (Dr. Verska 
Depo Tr., p. 37, LL 7 - 15). Regardless, as addressed infra, this administrative methodology of 
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attempting to utilize credibility findings as a means to "undiagnose" medical opinions seemingly 
contravenes controlling legal authority. Knowlton v. Wood River 1\4edical Center, l 51 Idaho 
135, 145. Coincidentally, Jordan gave a proximate historical rendition of post 2006, "He reports 
that he had no restrictions or limitations" to the Defense physiatrist consultant, Dr. Freidman, 
and not once in its deliberations, did the Commission attempt to similarly discredit Dr. 
Friedman's resulting opinions. Hr'g Ex. I, pg. 754. Notably, the Commission never explained 
exactly how the opinions of Drs. Doerr and Verska were ineparably corrupted, while Dr. 
Friedman's opinions, premised upon the same history/narrative, were somehow immune from 
such administrative scrutiny. 
The record also reveals that the Commission, largely ignored the reality that Jordan's 
hearing testimony was wholly consistent with that he provided during his July 24, 2012, 
deposition. It would seem that such "consistent testimonies" is exactly the "other type of 
evidence in record" which the Commission was required to consider when addressing Jordan's 
credibility. Clark v. Shari's Management Corp., 155 Idaho at 636. 
With respect to credibility, as a matter of la\v, Jordan's ''observational" demeanor is not 
m question and "substantively" he provided wholly consistent testimonies supported by a 
preponderance of "the other evidence" in the record. As to the Commission's purported 
credibility findings, it is not reasonable to treat Jordan in a "one size fits all" manner, while 
simultaneously ignoring his unrefoted personal circumstances. Likewise, it is not reasonable to 
purport to rely upon testimony which never actually transpired and evidence that does not exist. 
Similarly, it is not reasonable to summarily ignore a treating physician's testimonial 
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qualifications/explanations in contravention of controlling judicial dictates. Fmiher, it is not 
reasonable to construe an injured worker's "personal and practical" view of a work-related 
accident or injury in a manner \vhich contravenes controlling law and judicial mandates. 
Additionally. it is not reasonable to interpret medical records in a manner which always 
prejudices the injured worker. Moreover, it is not reasonable to treat similarly situated medical 
witnesses in a disparate manner. Thus, the Commission's findings that "Claimant's testimony 
concerning the history and cause of his symptoms following the 2006 and 2010 accidents lacks 
substantive credibility" are not supported by the record, nor controlling law and are thereby not 
premised upon substantial and competent evidence. Therefore, the Commission's "substantive" 
credibility conclusions should be reversed. 
2. The Commission's conclusion that Jordan failed to adduce medical 
proof sufficient to demonstrate lumbar injuries/aggravations 
necessitating surgery as a result of the uncontested Janumy 12, 2010, 
industrial accident, i.,, not supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. 
The Commission's "injury" and/or "surgery" detennination is not based on substantial 
and competent evidence. There must be evidence of medical opinion, by way of a physician's 
testimony or written medical record, supporting the claim for compensation to a reasonable 
degree of medical probability. The Court has held that no special fonnula is necessary when 
medical evidence plainly and unequivocally conveys a doctor's conviction that the events of 
an industrial accident and injury are causally related. Paulson v. Idaho Forest Indust., Inc., 99 
Idaho 896, 901, 591 P .2d 143 (1979) ( emphasis added). "There is no absolute requirement 
however that the opinion evidence be presented by the expert testifying either at the hearing or 
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by deposition." Anderson v. Ha1per's/11c., 143 Idaho 193,196,141 P.3d 1062 (2006). "When 
an injury occurs on an employer's premises, a presumption arises that the injury arose out of the 
claimant's employment" Vawter v. UPS, Inc., 155 Idaho 903, 318 P.3d 893, 898 (2014). "Case 
law holds that doubts about an injury arising out of and in the course of employment are resolved 
in favor of the claimant." Page v. ~McCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 348, 109 P.3d l 084 
(2005) ( citation omitted). At a minimum, the opinions/records of at least two practicing Board 
Certified orthopedic surgeons preponderantly establish that Claimant suffered cervical 
injuries/aggravations necessitating fusion surgery as a direct result of the subject January 12, 
2010, industrial accident. 
Initially, other than its attempt to administratively "undiagnose" the opinions of two 
Board Certified orthopedic surgeons, the Commission did not proffer any substantive critiques as 
to Ors. Verska's or Doerr's surgical expertise, nor the medical premise of their respective 
ultimate causation opinions. Notably, the Commission also addressed the preeminent contested 
issue in tern1s of a "cervical spine surgery" necessitated by either of the uncontested industrial 
accidents. R., pg. 28 ( emphasis added). 
To that end, given the Commission's overriding "cervical spine surgery" designation in 
this case, the irrefutable facts in evidence document that Dr. Verska and Dr. Doerr are the only 
Board Certified Orthopedic Surgeons involved in this Jordan's case. Realistically, on a 
comparison of orthopedic spine surgical/medical expertise, this case presents a significant 
disparity. Dr. Friedman freely conceded that he is not a surgeon, does not have any surgical 
expertise and when the issue of cervical surgical intervention arises. he refers patients to 
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orthopedic surgeons such as Dr. Doerr. (Dr. Friedman Depo Tr., p. 20, LI. 24 - p. 21, 1. 9). In 
fact, at one point, in seemingly acknowledging his lack of expertise in such matters, Dr. 
Friedman conceded " . . . I can't tell you it would be inconsistent with an acute episode. It's 
hard to tell the difference between an ongoing chronic problem ... and an acute injury 
superimposed.'' (Dr. Friedman Depo Tr., p. 17, LI. 20 - 24) ( emphasis added). Conversely, Dr. 
Verska's practice is dedicated solely to spine treatment wherein he has treated thousands of 
patients with similar cervical conditions and perfonned hundreds of C4-7 surgeries. (Dr. Verska 
Depo Tr., p. 7, LL 2 - p. 8, LI. 5). Significantly, Dr. Doerr actually perfonned the surgery at 
issue in this case and even Appellants concede that it was a reasonable treatment with fairly good 
results. See, Defs' 1/13/15 Post-Hr'g Response Brief, pg. 14. 
As to causation, upon receiving all of the pertinent factual and medical infonnation, Dr. 
Doerr, in his capacity as Jordan's treating Board Certified orthopedic surgeon, unequivocally 
opined 'I do believe that Edward's initial injury on 5/16/06 resulted in his C4-5 and C5-6 injuries 
causing neck pain with radiculopathy. His 01/12/10 injury resulted in a traumatic event with 
permanent aggravation of his initial preexisting injury." Hr' g Ex. E, pg. 77. ( emphasis 
added). Notably, on at least two (2) occasions, including another September 27, 2011, letter sent 
directly to the Surety responsible for the 2006 uncontested accident, Dr. Doerr specifically 
discredited any inference that Claimant's symptoms were the result of "progressive degeneration 
since the MRI on 5/25/06," versus being "clearly related to his industrial injury." Id. at pgs. 61 
and 64 ( emphasis added). Fmiher, in assessing impainnent, Dr. Doerr detennined that there 
was "no apportionment for preexisting disease." Id. at pg. 102 (emphasis added). 
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Remarkably, when repeatedly pressed as to the possible relevance of cervical degenerative joint 
disease, Dr. Foutz, Jordan's treating Board Certified family practitioner, opined "l \vould go 
further than that I would say without some kind of additional injury, it would be unlikely 
that arthritis alone caused all the changes we saw.'' (Dr. Foutz Depo Tr., pg. 22, LI. 6-13 ). 
Appreciably, Dr. Joseph Vcrska, a Board Ce1iified orthopedic surgeon, provided expert, 
independent, orthopedic evidence that corroborated these well-founded opinions. Specifically, 
upon perfonning a comprehensive record review, actually obtaining and personally interpreting 
all of the pertinent diagnostic imaging, along with conducting a thorough clinical examination of 
Jordan, Dr. Verska set fmih that the January 12, 20 I 0, industrial accident constituted "a specific 
event that resulted in specific symptoms that did not resolve with conservative care" and 
opined that: 
[O]n a more probable-than-not basis that the 2010 injury caused him to have disc 
herniations at C5-C6 and C6-C7 and aggravated the preexisting degenerative 
changes at C4-C5 requiring him to have surgery at C4-C5, C5-C6, and C6-C7 by 
Timothy Doerr." 
Hr'g Ex. F, pg. I 07 (emphasis added); (Dr. Verska Depo Tr., p. 18, Ll. 12-25). When questioned 
about the cervical-related injurious and aggravating nature of the January 12, 2010, mechanics 
involved with Jordan physically maneuvering the one-ton dolly, Dr. Verska explained, 
"Absolutely. Typically, patients that arc lifting, twisting, exerting a force can hmi their neck. 
It's very common." (Dr. Verska Depo Tr., p. 16, LL 22 - p. 17, Ll. 4). According to Dr. 
Verska, all of the cervical-related medical treatment Jordan received follmving the 2010 dolly 
work-related accident, including, but not necessarily limited to, the June 6, 2012, three-level 
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anterior disccctomy and fusion performed by Dr. Doerr, was necessitated by the injuries 
;aggravations Jordan suffered as a direct result of the January 12, 20 l(J, industrial accident. (Dr. 
Verska Depo Tr., p. 19, LL 20 p. 20, LL 7). 
Significantly, when questioned as to the unrelenting parascapular "knot" and "burning 
sensation" symptoms Jordan was documented as experiencing upon his February 16, 20 I 0, 
discharge from 0cc Health, Dr. Verska expounded: 
Yes. Pain between the shoulder blades, particularly the parascapular area, are 
very classic representation of pain referred from the neck. There's diagrams 
that have mapped out which levels give pain to which part of the medial border 
of the scapula. 
So it's very common to have neck pathology with parascapular pain. In 
addition, burning is a very common word that people use to describe nerve 
problems. 
(Dr. Verska Depo Tr., p. 14, LL 10 p. 15, LL 10). Astoundingly, Respondents' retained 
physiatrist, Dr. Friedman, implicitly confim1ed Dr. Verska's professional assessment by 
acknowledging: 
So he had pins and needles down his forearn1 into his thumb area, he had burning 
pain, achy pin, and stabbing pain along the top of his shoulder blade ... it 
matches the anatomy 
************* 
Well it's [burning sensation] in the distribution of the nerve root. If you were to 
map someone's sensation on the front of their arm, their foreann from their elbow 
into the first web space, that would be C5 or C6 root distribution - - just where 
you'd expect it. 
(Dr. Friedman Depo Tr., p.16, LL 13-17; p. 34, LL 17 p. 3 5, LL 1) ( emphasis added). 
Notably, aside from his orthopedic medical/surgical experience and expertise, m 
addressing the demonstrative nature of Jordan's documented "knot" and "burning sensation" 
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symptoms following the January 12, 2010, industrial accident, Dr. Verska imparted unparalleled 
practical and personal insight into Jordan's case by revealing: 
And I've had this same problem with my neck and had very similar symptoms 
that Mr. Jordan had. 
(Dr. Verska Depo Tr., p. 15, LL 11-12) (emphasis added). To that end, Dr. Verska vehemently 
disagreed with the 0cc Health's discharging physician's prognosis that somehow Jordan's 
symptoms "did not indicate any significant pathology and should resolve gradually over time," 
explaining: 
[H]e didn't get better in 2010. So I think if you want to see if he's going to get 
better, you've got to keep on following him and seeing him until he does get 
better. You just can't stick a needle in his back and say bye-bye. 
(Dr. Verska Depo Tr., p. 15, LL 13 - p. 16, LL 5). Dr. Verska also opined that 0cc Health 
should have performed another cervical MRI following the January 12, 2010, industrial accident, 
as Jordan had enough symptoms to warrant such diagnostic imaging. (Dr. Verska Depo Tr., p. 
13, LI. 18 p. 14, LI. 8). Notably, Dr. Verska affinned that in his experience, individuals in 
Jordan's situation who are provided with assurances, such as their "pain does not indicate any 
significant pathology and should resolve gradually over time," "will listen to their doctor and 
believe them and do what they say and are pretty trusting." (Dr. Verska Depo Tr., p. 16, LL 6-
13) (emphasis added). 
As discussed inf,-a, while attempting to administratively "undiagnose" the opinions of 
Ors. Doerr and Verska, the Commission purported to summarily declare that "The most credible 
opinion is that of Dr. Friedman, ,vho offered a cogent opinion ... " R., pg. 35. The evidence in 
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record proves that Dr. Friedman's ultimate opinions were anything but "cogent" and otherwise 
not premised on all of the available pertinent medical evidence. 
By \Vay of example, Dr. Friedman did not personally review Claimant's 2010 treatment 
records when he generated his December 22,2011, IME report. (Dr. Friedman Depo Tr., p.9, LI. 
2-7; p. 29, LL 4 - 7); Hr'g Ex. 1, pg. 759-60. In addressing numerous mistakes contained in his 
December 22, 2011, IME report, it is apparent that Dr. Friedman merely regurgitated infom1ation 
he extrapolated second-hand from Dr. Doerr's treatment records. (Dr. Friedman Depo Tr., p. 26, 
LL 6 - 19; p. 30, LI. 1-30). In addressing the fact that he ascribed the wrong date to Claimant's 
2010 industrial accident, Dr. Friedman testified: 
A. Well, it's in Dr. Doerr's report. He reported it to me. It's not in the records 
I was sent. 
******************* 
A. ... "Well it must have happened because Dr. Doerr put it in his report with a 
date," so he had something I didn't have. 
(Dr. Friedman Depo Tr., p. 30, LL 1 - 8) (emphasis added). At one point, Dr. Friedman 
admitted that he did not even perfonn a comprehensive review of Dr. Doerr's surgical report and 
could not recall why he actually used the tenn "aggravation" in his IME report. (Dr. Friedman 
Depo Tr., p. 24, LI. 16 - 20; p. 30, LL 15-22). Moreover, unlike Dr. Verski', and Dr. Doerr, Dr. 
Freidman never personally reviewed the actual MRI diagnostic imaging films, but apparently 
merely relied upon radiological impressions 7. 
6 (Dr. Verska Depa Tr., p. 27. LL 4 21). 
7 Appellant's counsel had to provide Dr. Friedman ·with copies of the 5125-106 and 8123 11 MRI reports during his 
post-hearing deposition. (Dr. Friedman Depa Tr., p. 13, LL 20-22; p. 16. LL 4). 
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Significantly, the record establishes that Respondents never provided Dr. Friedman with, 
nor did he ever review, the third pre-operative May 25, 2012, MRI. Hr'g Ex. E, pg. 78. This 
omission is fundamental, given that the MRI's demonstration of "unchanged" disc herniations 
\Vith '"No significant change compared to the scan dated August 23, 20 l 1" only objectively 
fmiher contradicts the defensive proposition that Jordan's cervical conditions ,vere the result of 
"significant," on-going degeneration. Hr'g Ex. E, pg. 78 (emphasis added). Notably, the 
Commission expressed skepticism over this exact type of diagnostic imaging omission in an 
instance where Dr. Friedman utilized the same approach. See, Bogar v. Sodexo Inc.,, 2012 IIC 
0100.1, 0100.6 (2012) ("In arriving at these conclusions, Dr. Friedman apparently neither took 
nor revie\ved any x-rays of Claimant's back"), see also, Davis v. US Silver-Idaho, Inc., 2012 
IIC 0103.1, 0103.12 (2012) ("Even so, [Dr. Friedman] did not have access to the actual films for 
the 2002, 2005 and 2008 MRls"). Jordan cannot speak as to the reasons the why the Industrial 
Commission failed to even acknowledge the irrefutable fact that Dr. Friedman's opinions were 
not premised on a review of the May 25, 2012, MRI, or the Commissions refusal to consider its 
previous reproaches of such assessment methodologies. However, such unilateral administrative 
refusal and/or abstention appears arbitrary, capricious and wholly prejudicial to Jordan. 
Finally, the insunnountable deficits in Dr. Friedman's opinions encompass what he failed 
to directly address in relation to the objective factual and medical evidence. First, Dr. Friedman 
failed to reconcile how exactly Jordan presented for the December 22, 2011, IME, with cervical 
symptoms, including right scapular "burning" pain, that were virtually identical to those he was 
exhibiting at the time Dr. Heiner discharged him in February of 2010. This is especially relevant 
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given Dr. Friedman's testimony that the C5-6 "disk bulges, narrO\ving of the canal," nerve root 
.. matches the anatomy" 'just where you would expect it.q (Dr. Friedman Depo Tr., p.16, LL 5-
17; p. 34, LL 17 - p. 35, LL 1 ). Significantly, Dr. Friedman completely failed to delineate 
exactly \Vhen Jordan's indistinguishable cervical symptoms as caused by the "Exacerbation of 
cervical spine in 2010," were supposedly subsumed by the purported "significant" on-going 
cervical DJD process. Hr'g Ex. No. I, pg. 756. Astoundingly, the Commission resoundingly 
rejected this kind of non sequitur medical approach in setting forth: 
Ho\vever, Dr. Freidman did not reconcile this opinion with . . . the facts of this 
case; Claimant experienced a dramatic worsening of his symptoms immediately 
following the subject accident Dr. Friedman did not explain how this sudden 
change can be squared with his belief that Claimant's condition worsened 
gradually over time. For these reasons, we find Dr. Friedman's opinion to be less 
persuasive. 
Davis v. US Silver-Idaho, Inc., 2013 IIC 0048.1, 0048.3 (2013) (on reconsideration) (emphasis 
added). As before, Jordan cannot speak as to the reasons the why the Industrial Commission 
failed to even acknowledge its previous critiques of such medical assessment methodologies, but 
such appears arbitrary, capricious and is inarguably prejudicial to Jordan. 
The preponderant, overwhelming objective, credible medical evidence proves that Jordan 
suffered C5-6 and C6-7 disc herniations along with the aggravation of preexisting changes at C4-
5 as a direct result of the January 12, 2010, industrial accident, thereby necessitating the June 6, 
2012, three-level fusion surgery perfonned by Dr. Doerr. It is not reasonable for the 
Commission to summarily discount and/or attempt to administratively "undiagnose" the expert 
causation opinions of two Board Certified orthopedic surgeons. Likewise, it is not reasonable for 
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the Commission to ignore the irrefutable fact that Dr. Friedman's physiatrist-based op1111ons 
were not premised on all of the available medical evidence. Similarly, it is unreasonable for the 
Commission to ignore the unrebutted evidence that Dr. Friedman never reviewed the third pre-
operative May 25, 2012, MRI. Moreover, it is not reasonable for the Commission to ignore its 
own prior administrative holdings admonishing purported medical opinions that fail to account 
for pertinent medical diagnostic imaging and/or adopt a non sequitur analytical methodology. 
As such, Jordan's medical evidence stands unrebutted by any substantial and competent 
evidence. Thus, the Commission's conclusion that Jordan "failed to prove by a preponderance of 
evidence that his 2012 cervical spine surgery was necessitated, in whole or in part, by either the 
2006 or 2010 industrial accidents," is not supported by the record and thereby not premised upon 
substantial and competent evidence. Therefore, the Commission's injury and/or surgery 
conclusions should be reversed and remanded. 
B. The Industrial Commission Erred in Determining that All Remaining Issues 
Were Moot. 
As set forth infra, the substantial and competent evidence proves that Jordan suffered C5-
6 and C6-7 disc herniations, along with the aggravation of preexisting changes at C4-5 as a direct 
result of the January 12, 20 I 0, industrial accident, thereby necessitating the June 6, 2012, three-
level fusion surgery perfonned by Dr. Doerr. As such, the Commission erred in concluding that 
"All other issues are moot." R., pg. 36. Thus, Jordan is entitled to all corresponding benefits 
available under the Act, including, but not necessarily limited to, medical care, TTDs, PPI and 
disability. See, l.C. §§ 72-408, 422, 424, 430 and 432. Therefore, the Court should order 
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remand of all remaining issues for impartial deliberation upon the recorded facts in accord with 
controlling law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In consideration of the foregoing argument and authority, Jordan respectfully requests 
that the Court: reverse the Commission's findings that "Claimant's testimony concerning the 
history and cause of his symptoms following the 2006 and 2010 accidents lacks substantive 
credibility;" reverse the Commission's conclusion that Jordan "failed to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that his 2012 cervical spine surgery was necessitated, in whole or in 
part, by either the 2006 or 2010 industrial accidents;" reverse the Commission's conclusion that 
"All other issues are moot;" and award attorney fees and costs to Appellant for all stages of 
Jordan's claim, including those below, on appeal and any on remand; and remand for 
proceedings consistent therewith. 
~ 
DATED this \b day of October, 2015. 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
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